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ARTICLES

"STUDENT-INITIATED" PRAYER:
ASSESSING THE NEWEST INITIATIVES
TO RETURN PRAYER TO THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
JESSICA SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

In November 1994, Newt Gingrich, the Georgia Republican
Congressman who would later become Speaker of the United
States House of Representatives, called for hearings and a House
vote on a school prayer amendment by July 4, 1995.' Initially,
President Clinton stated that he would consider the amendment.2
Later, he indicated that he would oppose it. 3 Although the rheto-

* As an associate for the law firm of Covington & Burling in Washington,
D.C., Ms. Smith prepared appellate briefs on behalf of separationist
organizations in two "student-initiated" prayer cases: Adler v. Duval County
Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-2638 (11th
Cir. May 16, 1994) and Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1996)(No. 96-331). She
currently is a law clerk to Judge W. Earl Britt, United States District Court,
Eastern District of North Carolina. After her district court clerkship, Ms. Smith
will clerk for Judge James Dickson Phillips, Jr. on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
1. See Ann Devroy, School Prayer: Clinton May Seek Neutral Position,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 17, 1994, at Al.
2. See id.
3. See Tony Mauro, Clinton: No PrayerAmendment, USA TODAY, Nov. 23,
1994, at A8.
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ric in favor of a constitutional amendment continues, 4 the amendment has yet to materialize. 5
In the meantime, the contest over school prayer continues in
the nation's courts. The latest round of litigation is over the constitutionality of what has been inappropriately dubbed "studentinitiated" prayer. This nomenclature is inapt because the prayer
at issue is not truly initiated and sponsored by the students.
Rather, it is initiated and sponsored by the school. While true student-initiated prayer is permissible, school-initiated and schoolsponsored prayer is not.
Supporters of the statutes, guidelines, and policies providing
for "student-initiated" prayer argue that the provisions are
designed to protect the free exercise and free speech rights of
those students who wish to pray. In fact, the provisions are
designed for no such purpose. They are the latest attempt by the
proponents of prayer to avoid the Supreme Court's prohibition on
school-sponsored prayer by relabelling it private "student-initiated" prayer. 6 Constitutional obligations, however, cannot be so
easily avoided.
Section I of this article discusses the impetus for the recent
spate of "student-initiated" prayer statutes, guidelines, and policies. The discussion includes a summary of existing provisions as
well as detailed accounts of the history and development of two
"student-initiated" prayer efforts. These accounts, which chronicle the development of initiatives in Florida and Mississippi,
4. See, e.g., Melanie Markley, Campaign '96 Issues, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 8,
1996, at A4 (reporting former Republican presidential candidate Patrick
Buchanan's statement that he is running on a platform that includes a
constitutional amendment to restore prayer and Bible reading in the public
schools and quoting Buchanan as saying: "We are going to put the full power of
that oval office, of that bully pulpit, behind a constitutional amendment to
restore voluntary prayer and voluntary Bible reading to the public schools. We
are going to bring back the God of the Bible, and we are going to drive the gods of
secular humanism right out of public education.").
5. Effecting a constitutional amendment is nothing short of a herculean task.
Just to propose an amendment, supporters must obtain a two-thirds vote in both
houses of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. V. The proposal must then be ratified by
three-fourths of the states. Id. Since 1791, more than 10,700 amendments have
been introduced in Congress and only 33 have been proposed to the states. Out
of that number, 27 have been ratified. Terry Eastland, Rule of Law: To Amend,
Or Not To Amend?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1994, at A15.
6. For Supreme Court cases prohibiting school-sponsored prayer and schoolsponsored activities that promote religion, see infra note 15 and accompanying
text.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/1
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expose the ruse of "student-initiated" prayer. The accounts
demonstrate that regardless of how the initiatives were promoted
or disguised, their true purpose was not to protect students' rights
of free speech and free exercise but to promote prayer.
Section II challenges the new initiatives on constitutional
grounds. Rather than apply the much maligned Lemon test 7 or
the "coercion test" announced by the Supreme Court in Lee v.
Weisman,8 this article argues that one need not even engage in a
Lemon or Lee analysis to determine that the new school prayer
initiatives must fail. Specifically, it argues that schools cannot
avoid their constitutional obligations by delegating their decisions
regarding school prayer to the students. This section goes on to
distinguish the new initiatives from those scenarios that truly
involve private student speakers and explains why the free speech
and free exercise arguments asserted in support of the initiatives
are without merit.
Finally, Section III points out two byproducts of school-sponsored prayer that are often overlooked in the political debate:
divisiveness and degradation of religion. These byproducts should
be of concern to all -

separationists and religionists

-

and cau-

tion strongly against school-sponsored prayer.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW INITIATIVES

A. After Lee And Jones
In June 1992, the Supreme Court decided Lee v. Weisman.9
In Lee, the Supreme Court held that a Providence, Rhode Island
school violated the Establishment Clause by arranging for a rabbi
to offer an invocation and benediction at a high school graduation
ceremony. According to the Court, two dominant facts controlled
its decision: (1) state involvement and (2) the obligatory nature of
the students' attendance and participation in the religious activity.10 The Court found impermissible government involvement
7. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The three-pronged Lemon test
requires a court to ask whether a challenged statute, rule, or practice (1) has a
secular purpose; (2) has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) avoids an excessive entanglement of government with religion.
Id. at 612-13. If even one of these questions is answered in the negative, the
statute, rule, or practice violates the Establishment Clause. Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980).
8. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 586.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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because the principal decided that the prayer would be given,
chose the religious participant, provided him with a copy of
"Guidelines for Civic Occasions," and advised him that the prayers
should be nonsectarian. 1 The Court also found that participation
in the religious exercise was obligatory. It stated:
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and
control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a
group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the Invocation and Benediction. This pressure, though
subtle and indirect,
12
can be as real as any overt compulsion.
Finally, the Court found that attendance at the graduation was
not truly voluntary: "[T]o say a teenage student has a real choice
not to attend her high school graduation is formalistic in the
extreme." 3 Thus, the Court held that the state compelled students to participate in a religious exercise in violation of the
4
Establishment Clause.'
Lee was the most recent in a long line of Supreme Court cases
prohibiting school-sponsored prayer and school-sponsored religious activities in the public schools.' 5 Yet, despite the decision,
proponents of prayer continue to search for techniques to put such
prayer in the public schools. 16 "Student-initiated" prayer is the
technique of the moment. Although the idea of "student-initiated"

11. Id. at 587-88.
12. Id. at 593.
13. Id. at 595.
14. Id. at 599.
15. See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment of silence); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting of Ten Commandments); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (daily Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) (daily recitation of "denominationally neutral" prayer); Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious leaders' use of
class time for religious instruction).
16. See News, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 1992, at A8 (reporting that members of
20 churches in Newport, Arkansas signed petitions urging the school board to
find a way around Lee).
Some schools, however, just ignore Supreme Court case law prohibiting
school-sponsored prayer. See David E. Rosenbaum, Prayerin Many Schoolrooms
Continues Despite '62 Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1984, at Al ("Mrs. Hunter's
[second grade] class is one of many across the nation where, despite the Supreme
Court's prohibition on organized prayer in the schools more than 20 years ago,
students continue to recite prayers, sing hymns or read the Bible aloud.").
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/1
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prayer in school is not new to the courts,1 7 the idea of repackaging
school-sponsored prayer as student prayer gained momentum
after the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered an anomalous decision in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District.18
Jones was decided six months after Lee and was the first modern "student-initiated" prayer case to reach the federal appellate
courts. 19 Jones dealt with a school district policy that allowed students to decide whether to have graduation prayer. Jones held
17. The technique appears to have made its first court appearance over 30
years ago in Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1965). Stein involved an action by parents to enjoin school officials from
preventing students from reciting prayers in school on their own initiative.
Assuming but not deciding that the Establishment Clause would not prohibit the
activity in question, Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, held that
neither the free speech nor the free exercise clauses compelled that the prayer be
allowed. Id. at 1001. He stated: "Neither provision requires a state to permit
persons to engage in public prayer in state-owned facilities wherever and
whenever they desire." Id.
18. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
Explaining the anomaly of the Jones decision, J. Alexander Tanford states:
[A]mong all the more than one hundred federal appellate cases on the
application of the Establishment Clause to public schools decided in the
last fifty years, only [Jones] permitted a religious exercise in connection
with an official school activity. Every other appellate case has declared
religious activity at official school functions unconstitutional.
J. Alexander Tanford, The Death of Graduation Prayer: The Parrot Sketch
Redux, 24 J.L. & EDUC. 423, 430 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Since Tanford's
article, Jones's holding allowing "student-initiated" graduation prayer was
followed by another Fifth Circuit case. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88
F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1996)(No.
96-331). Ingebretsen, however, declared "student-initiated" prayer in all other
school settings unconstitutional. Id.
19. For a discussion of an earlier case, see supra note 17 (discussing Stein v.
Oshinsky).
Jones was followed by ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84
F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding "student-initiated" prayer
unconstitutional); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994)
(same), vacated as moot, 115 S.Ct. 2604 (1995); Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d 274 (holding
"student-initiated" prayer unconstitutional in all settings except graduation). A
decision is pending on this issue in the Eleventh Circuit. See Adler v. Duval
County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-2638
(11th Cir. May 16, 1994). Oral argument was heard in the Adler case in August,
1996.
Jones also was followed by two district court decisions declaring "studentinitiated" prayer unconstitutional. See Friedmann v. Sheldon Community Sch.
Dist., No. C93-4052 (N.D. Iowa May 28, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 995 F.2d
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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that because the school district had not engaged in acts of state
control similar to those in Lee, the prayer did not run afoul of the
Establishment Clause.20 It further held that because the students
participated in the decision to have prayer, there was less coercive
effect on the students who attended graduation than on the students in Lee.2"
Armed with Jones, proponents of school prayer inundated
school officials and legislatures with requests for prayer in the
public schools.22 In the forefront of the movement was the Christian Coalition and Pat Robertson's American Center for Law and
Justice.23 The result was a groundswell of initiatives to
recharacterize school-sponsored prayer as "student-initiated"
prayer.24
B. A Look At What Has Developed
Since 1992, "student-initiated" prayer statutes have been

2 6 Missis25
enacted in six states including Alabama, Tennessee,
30
29
8
2
27
Legislation has
Virginia, Louisiana, and Georgia.
sippi,

802 (8th Cir. 1993); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
20. Jones, 977 F.2d at 970-71.
21. Id. at 971. Jones also held that the school district's policy passed the
Lemon test. Id. at 966-69.
22. Ronald Smothers, School Prayer Gaining Ground in South, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1994, at A12 (Jones has given impetus to efforts in the state
legislatures); see also infra text accompanying notes 52-59 (quoting
memorandum accompanying Duval County guidelines as stating: "Most of you
have recently been bombarded with information, as have I, regarding whether or
not student initiated and led prayers are acceptable based upon a recent Fifth
Circuit opinion.").
23. See Smothers, supra note 22, at A12 (noting that the Christian Coalition
and American Center for Law and Justice argued that Jones made school prayer
legal when it was spontaneous, initiated and led by students, nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing); Perry A. Zirkel, Graduation Invocations and Benedictions:
Good Faith Interpretations?,89 WEs's EDUC. L. REP. 1061 (1994) (noting that
after Jones, the American Center for Law and Justice mailed a memorandum to
15,000 school districts across the country that in effect accorded the denial of
certiorari in Jones that same status as the Court's decision in Lee).
24. See Tanford, supra note 18, at 433-34 (noting that after Lee, "religionists'
argument that some kind of prayer should be on the graduation program has...
shifted to 'student-initiated' prayer").
25. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3 (1993).
26. TENN.CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004 (1993).
27. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-4.1 (1995).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203.1 (Michie 1994).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/1
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been proposed in other jurisdictions.3 1 Additionally, initiatives
have been adopted by school officials in other states by way of
"guidelines" and ad hoc policies.3 2
Proponents of the new initiatives argue that their purpose is
to protect the free speech and free exercise rights of the students
who wish to engage in prayer. 33 These arguments, however, are
disingenuous. The initiatives have only one true purpose: to put
prayer in the public schools. Consider the prayer initiatives in
Mississippi and Florida.
1.

The State's Attempt to Return Prayer To The Public
Schools In Mississippi

In 1994, the Mississippi legislature enacted a statute entitled:
"An Act To Permit Nonsectarian, Nonproselytizing, Student-Initiated Prayer On Public School Property [And] Other... Property
At School-Related Activities ....

"3

The statute, which provides

for "student-initiated" prayer states, in relevant part:
On public school property, other public property or other property,
invocations, benedictions or nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer shall be permitted during compulsory or noncompulsory school-related student assemblies, student
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2115.1-2115.9 (West 1996).
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (1994).
31. See School Prayer Court Cases, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 11, 1994, at

10 of "Largo-Seminole Times" section (reporting on legislation in Florida, the
District of Columbia, and South Carolina); David G. Savage, A Duel Over Prayer
In Schools, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at Al (reporting that bill is pending in
Oklahoma); Ben Smith III, Legislature '94: Day 35 School PrayerBackers Cite
Texas Case, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 5, 1994, at B4 (reporting that bill is pending
in Pennsylvania).
32. One set of guidelines, promulgated by the Duval County School Board, is
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 49-67. Another was promulgated by
an Idaho school superintendent and is set forth in Harris v. Joint School District
No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638, 641 n.7 (D. Idaho 1993), affd in part,rev'd in part, 41
F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 115 S.Ct. 2604 (1995).
Informal policies have sprung up in a number of schools. Dr. Bishop Knox's
policy of allowing students to offer prayers over the school's public address
system is perhaps the most well-known example. See infra text accompanying
notes 38-40. For another, see Herdahl v. Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 887 F.

Supp. 902, 905 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
33. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-4.1 (1995) (stating that intent of
legislature is to protect freedom of speech and accommodation of religion).
34. Id.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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sporting events, graduation or commencement ceremonies and
35
other school-related student events.
By its terms, the statute allows student prayer at any school activity - homeroom, classroom periods, assemblies, pep rallies, PTA
meetings, and sporting events, to name a few - regardless of
whether the students' attendance is mandatory.3 6 Note also that
the statute gives a special platform to prayer. It states that
prayer "shall be permitted." No other speech is afforded such special status. No other speech is guaranteed a special time in school.
There can be no question that the Mississippi statute was
enacted for the purpose of returning prayer to public schools. Not
only does the title of the act speak for itself,3 7 but the circumstances leading to the statute's enactment confirm its purpose.
In November 1993, in response to a vote by the majority of
students, Dr. Bishop Knox, principal of Wingfield High School, in
Jackson, Mississippi, authorized the student body president to
deliver a prayer over the school's public address system. 38 The
prayer was delivered on three consecutive days. 3 9 Knox allowed
the prayer to occur even though the school district's attorney
advised him that it was impermissible.4" On November 11, 1993,
Knox was placed on administrative leave. 41 Later that month, the
School Superintendent terminated Knox's employment.4 2 In
December 1993, the School Board decided to suspend rather than
terminate Knox.4 3 Knox appealed and was reinstated.4 4
35. Id. § 1.
36. The focus of this article is, of course, on student prayer. It should be
noted, however, that this statute is of astonishing scope. The statute is not
limited to student prayer; it allows prayer to be offered by teachers and clergy.
In this respect, the statute is in direct violation of the law. See Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
37. As stated above, the title of the act was: "An Act To Permit... Prayer On
Public School Property [And] Other . . . Property At School-Related Activities
" MISS. CODE ANN.§ 37-13-4.1 (1994) (emphasis added).
38. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1478 (S.D.
Miss. 1994), affd, 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3333
(U.S. Nov. 4, 1996)(No. 96-331).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

...
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Knox's suspension sparked debate throughout Mississippi
about the role of prayer in the public schools.45 Rallies were held
in support of school prayer. One of the largest rallies was held at
the state capitol and featured a supportive speech by the
governor.46
In response to the public support for Knox, on March 24,
1994, the Mississippi Senate passed a resolution commending
Knox "for his dedication to prayer in the public schools."47 The
resolution notes that Knox's "forthright action has been the catalyst for a renewed effort all over this state and nation to return
prayer to our public schools."48 Five days later, the legislature
passed the school prayer statute authorizing "student-initiated"
prayer.
As is apparent from these facts, the Mississippi statute was
enacted not to protect free speech and free exercise rights but to
satisfy the wishes of those who wanted to return prayer to the
Mississippi public schools.
2. The Duval County Initiative
Not all decisionmakers are as open as the Mississippi legislature about their true purpose in authorizing "student-initiated"
prayer. In fact, some guidelines are drafted so that the word
"prayer" is never stated. The guidelines promulgated by the
Duval County Florida School Board are one such example.
The Duval County guidelines provide:
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to
exceed two minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest
within the discretion of the graduating senior class;
2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a student volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating senior class as a whole;
3.

If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening and/or

closing message, the content of that message shall be prepared by
the student volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise
45. Id. at 1479.
46. Id.
47. Brief for National PEARL at 7, Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88
F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-60631) (providing citation to record), cert.
denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1996)(No. 96-331).
48. Id. at 7-8 (providing citation to record).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996
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reviewed by Duval County School Board, its officers or employees
49

Although the Duval County guidelines do not expressly mention prayer, the undisputed facts leading to their promulgation
and the facts surrounding their implementation leave no doubt as
to their true purpose.
For many years, invocations, benedictions and other religious
prayers or messages had been offered at Duval County public high
school graduations.5 ° In June 1992, Lee was decided. On July 22,
1992, the Duval County School Board informed the district's principals that "due to the recent Supreme Court Ruling in Lee v.
Weisman, there should be no prayer, benediction, or invocation at
any graduation ceremonies." 5 1 Thereafter, several individuals
and organizations began to pursue ways to preserve graduation
prayer and to apply pressure on the school board to ensure that
prayer would continue to be offered at commencement exercises
despite Lee .52 The pastor of the First Baptist Church sent a letter
to school board officials candidly admitting that he was "'fish'[ing]
53
for ways to incorporate prayer in our graduation ceremonies."
board officials proposed ways to reinOther letters sent to school
54
prayer.
state graduation
In response to these letters urging that prayer be continued,
school officials reexamined the graduation prayer issue and
55
decided to develop guidelines to provide a vehicle for prayer.
Accordingly, on May 5, 1993, the School Board's legal liaison distributed a memorandum entitled "Graduation Prayers." The
memorandum set out guidelines for prayer at commencement
exercises. 56 In order to disguise the true purpose of the guidelines, they were drafted without mention of the word "prayer;"
they refer cryptically instead to student messages. The guidelines' stated purpose is to "allow the students to direct their own
graduation message without monitoring or review by school offi49. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1994),
appeal docketed, No. 94-2638 (11th Cir. May 16, 1994).
50. Brief for National PEARL, et al. at 4 & n.6, Adler v. Duval County Sch.
Bd., (11th Cir.) (No. 94-2638) (providing record citations) [hereinafter PEARL
Adler Br.].
51. Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 448; PEARL Adler Br., supra note 50, at 5.
52. PEARL Adler Br., supra note 50, at 5 (providing citation to record).
53. Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 451.
54. Id. at 448.
55. Id. at 448-49.

56. Id. at 449.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/1
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cials." 57 Prior to promulgation of the guidelines, school officials
were told that in order to be lawful, their action must be based on
a secular purpose.58
The memorandum accompanying the guidelines states:
You will recall that after the 1992 Supreme Court case of Lee
v. Wiseman [sic], you received a memorandum from me
instructing that because of the decision, we would no longer be
able to have prayers at graduation ceremonies. Most of you have
recently been bombarded with information, as have I, regarding
whether or not student initiated and led prayers are acceptable
based upon a recent Fifth Circuit opinion. The purpose of this
memorandum is to give you some guidelines on this issue if the
graduating students at your school desire to have some type of
brief opening and/or closing message by a student.
This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and we have
been threatened by lawsuits from both sides on the issue depending on what action we take. The key to the Lee v.Wiseman [sic]
decision was that the prayer given at the graduation ceremony
was directed and initiated by the school system, which made it
unconstitutional, rather than by permissive student choice and
initiative. With that premise in mind, the following guidelines
may be of some assistance ....59
At a June 1, 1993 school board meeting, the board considered
and rejected a motion for a moment of silence as an alternative to
the guidelines. 60 The discussion regarding the motion focused
exclusively on graduation prayer. Some specifically argued that
prayer should be perpetuated. One board member stated:
I cannot vote to allow our '93 graduating class to have a few minutes of silent meditation when we all know that in the past, someone has prayed out loud to thank the Lord for the 12 great and
successful years in school during this period of time. And now we
want silence ....

We need to tell everyone that our free public

schools are the cornerstone of this republic and that we want to
preserve this country and the things that made it great, that we
are all here because of God. 6 '

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
PEARL Adler Br., supra note 50, at 6 (providing citation to record).
Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 449.
Id.
PEARL Adler Br., supra note 50, at 6-7 (providing citations to record).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996

11

314

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW

[
1:0
[Vol.
18:303

Some argued that board members should not pursue their personal religious agendas in their official capacity.6 2 There was discussion about whether the guidelines violated Lee.6 3 And there
was discussion about how much it would cost to litigate the school
prayer issue. 64
The question put to the seniors in four of the schools was not
whether to have student messages at graduation but whether to
have prayer. 6 5 One ballot stated: "The issue of prayer at graduation has been left up to a vote of the senior class[.] Yes, I would
like to have prayer[.] [N]o, I would not like to have prayer."66
The Florida initiative was not designed to protect free speech
and free exercise. It was designed to promote prayer. Any argument to the contrary simply is an after-the-fact attempt to disguise the initiative's true purpose.
II.

ASSESSING THE

NEW

TECHNIQUE

The new technique of repackaging school-sponsored prayer as
"student-initiated" prayer fails because states may not avoid their
constitutional obligations by delegating their decisions to others.
Assertions of free speech or free exercise rights do not alter this
result.
A.

No Need To Engage In A Lemon Or Lee Analysis

In the short time since the technique of "student-initiated"
prayer made its appearance, much already has been written about
how it fares under the tests of Lemon and Lee. In fact, all of the
court decisions addressing challenges to "student-initiated" prayer
62. Id. at 7 ("I would ask you tonight to consider what your role is as an
educator elected to do educational things and not to further religious causes.")
(quoting record).
63. Id. ("I think this lawsuit will come when we violate the Supreme Court
ruling.") (quoting record).
64. Id. ("How much are we willing to spend to, you know, be a part of this
issue.") (quoting record).
65. Id. (citing to record).
66. Id. at 7 n.7 (quoting record).
67. It is not surprising that such an after-the-fact attempt has been made. To
pass muster under the first prong of the Lemon test, the initiative must have a
secular purpose. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). If the initiative
was designed to promote prayer, it fails the secular purpose prong.
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statutes, policies, and guidelines have analyzed the cases under
these tests. 68 There is, however, a simpler approach.
It is beyond dispute that the state cannot offer prayer in
school. Once it becomes apparent that this is exactly what the
state is doing under the guise of "student-initiated" prayer,
existing case law forecloses any argument that the new technique
passes Constitutional muster. This conclusion must be correct
because states cannot insulate themselves from constitutional violations by authorizing others to make decisions that if made by
the state, would violate the law. If the state cannot sponsor
prayer in school, it cannot authorize someone else to do the
same. 69 Were it otherwise, states could abdicate virtually all of
their constitutional responsibilities.70

68. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d.
Cir. 1996) (en banc); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th
Cir., 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch.
Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 4,
1996)(No. 96-331); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated as moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F.
Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-2638 (11th Cir. May 16,
1994); Friedmann v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., No. C93-4052 (N.D. Iowa
May 28, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993); Gearon v.
Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993).
69. This argument is, of course, at odds with Jones. Jones stated: "[A]
majority of students can do what the State acting on its own cannot do to
incorporate prayer in public high school graduation ceremonies." Jones, 977 F.2d
at 972. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jones. 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
Contrary to the statements of the proponents of prayer, see Rosemary C.
Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking:
Lessons From Lamb's Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REv. 1, 2 n.4 (1994), the Court's denial
of certiorari was not an affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's decision. As Justice
Felix Frankfurter stated: "[T]his Court has rigorously insisted that such a denial
carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits
of a case which it has declined to review." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
70. See Harris,41 F.3d at 455 (if school's delegate could make decisions that
school cannot make, schools could avoid the Establishment Clause); cf Goodwin
v. Cross County Sch. Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417, 424 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (school's
"Hands-Off" attitude will not satisfy its responsibility).
As the Ninth Circuit stated in Harris: "[E]lected officials cannot absolve
themselves of a constitutional duty by delegating their responsibilities to a
nongovernmental entity. Even private citizens when acting with government
authority must exercise that authority constitutionally." Harris 41 F.3d at 455.
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1. The Basic Problem With Delegation
When states authorize students to offer school prayer, they
are engaging in an impermissible delegation. As a preliminary
matter, states cannot delegate powers that they do not possess
themselves.7v Since the state has no power to direct the prayer
itself,7 2 it has no power to delegate that decision to the students.
More significantly, however, the act of delegating the decision
cannot "neutralize" or insulate the state from a constitutional violation. 3 An analogy is instructive. Suppose a state wishes to
exclude African-Americans from public school but knows that it is
prohibited from doing so directly. Knowing that the majority of
students in school are white and that they do not want AfricanAmericans to attend school, can the state authorize or allow the
students to vote to exclude African-Americans and then enforce
that decision claiming to be a neutral actor? Of course not.74 As
71. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976) (state cannot

delegate a power it cannot exercise itself); Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org.,
Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1536 (11th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 54 (1994).
72. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
73. ACLU, 84 F.3d at 1479 ("Although the delegation here may appear to
many to be no more than a neutral means of deciding whether prayer should be
included in the graduation, it does not insulate the School Board from the reach
of the First Amendment.").
74. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va.
1993) (students cannot vote to exclude persons of a certain race). Judge Doyle
put this point eloquently in his dissent in Lisco v. Love:
The protection of constitutional rights is not to be approached either
pragmatically or expediently, and though the fact of enactment of a
constitutional provision by heavy vote of the electorate produces pause
and generates restraint we can not, true to our oath, uphold such
legislation in the face of palpable infringement of rights. Thus, state
racial legislation would unquestionably enjoy overwhelming electorate
approval in certain of our states, yet no one would argue that this factor
could compensate for manifest inequality. It is too clear for argument
that constitutional law is not a matter of majority vote.
Lisco v. Love, 219 F. Supp. 922, 944 (D.Col. 1963), rev'd, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). His
argument was ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court. See Lucas v. FortyFourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); see also ACLU, 84 F.3d at
1477-78 ("There should be no question 'that the electorate as a whole, whether by
referendum or otherwise, could not order [governmental] action violative of the
[Constitution], and the [government] may not avoid the strictures of [the
Constitution] by deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the body
politic.'") (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448
(1985)). Apparently, however, as noted above, the Fifth Circuit believes
otherwise. See supra note 69. But see Harris,41 F.3d at 455 ("We cannot allow
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the Supreme Court has stated: "'[T]he constitutional rights of
children... can neither be nullified openly and directly by [the]
state ... nor nullified indirectly by [it] through evasive schemes
...whether attempted ingeniously or ingenuously.' 75 Thus, the

courts have rejected states' attempts to delegate their Establishment Clause obligations.76
Essentially, the decision of the students becomes one of the
state. An analogy can be made to the state action doctrine. In
that context, the question is whether the state is a neutral nonparticipant, or whether it is involved in the alleged violation of
constitutional rights.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
addressed this issue in Berger v. Rensselaer Central School
Corp.7 7 In Berger, a parent of public school students challenged
the school's policy of permitting representatives of the Gideons
International to distribute Bibles in school. 78 The Seventh Circuit
considered a free speech argument made on behalf of the Gideons
and rejected the assertion that the school did not participate in
the Bible distribution and that there was no state action. The
court stated:
the school district's delegate to make decisions that the school district cannot
make.").
75. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568 (1974) (quoting Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958)); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115
S. Ct. 1842, 1867 (1995) ("The Constitution nullifies sophisticated as well as
simple-minded modes of infringing on Constitutional protections.") (quotation
omitted).
76. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (school impermissibly authorized students to decide whether
to have graduation prayer); Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759
(9th Cir.) (school impermissibly authorized students to have prayer at school
assemblies), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1981) (statute impermissibly authorized teachers to ask students
whether they wish to have school prayer), affd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982); Goodwin v.
Cross County Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (school
impermissibly authorized students to offer prayer and Bible verses during
school); Gearon v. Loundon County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(school impermissibly authorized students to decide whether to have graduation
prayer); Friedmann v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., No. C93-4052 (N.D. Iowa
May 28, 1993), rev'd on othergrounds, 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). But
see Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446
(M.D. Fla. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 94-2638 (11th Cir. May 16, 1994).
77. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 911 (1993).
78. Id. at 1162.
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[T]he free speech argument presumes that the [school] did not
participate in the Bible distribution. In essence, this is an argument that the distribution of Gideon Bibles lacked state action.
Under this view, the [school] was merely a conduit or neutral nonparticipant through whose doors ideas could pass without changing or being changed by the schools' participation. Several key
facts belie the school[s] noninvolvement. The Bibles were distributed by Gideons - it is true - but in public schools, to young
children, in classrooms, during instructional time.., in the presence of the teacher and often the principal ....
The Berger court's conclusion is consistent with two prongs of the
state action doctrine.
Under the symbiotic relationship prong of the state action
doctrine, when multiple or joint contacts so intertwine the private
actor and the government, the private actor will be treated as a
government agent.8 0
Here, the school and the students enjoy a level of interdependence with respect to the prayer that warrants a finding that the
students are agents of the state. 8 ' The state authorizes the prayer
through legislation, guidelines, or policies. The state funds the
location where the prayer will be offered. The state regulates conduct during the prayer. It offers the microphone, lectern, platform,
stage, or public address system from which the prayer will be disseminated. The state compels attendance thus providing a captive audience for the prayer. State officials such as principals,
teachers, and administrators attend the prayer. And finally, the
state sets aside a special time for the prayer.
This latter fact, of "rationing" time exclusively for prayer, is
particularly significant. As the Supreme Court has stated in the
desegregation context:
If... the city or other governmental entity rations ... facilities,
the case for state action will naturally be stronger than if the facilities are simply available to all comers without condition or reservation.... The city's role in that situation would be dangerously
close to what was found to exist in [Burton v. Wilmington Parking
79. Id. at 1165-66 (footnote omitted).
80. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAr, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.4(b) at 558-59 (2d ed. 1992); Burton v.

Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
81. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (noting the position of interdependence
between state and private actor making the state a "joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered . . . 'purely
private.'").
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Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)], where the city had "elected to
place its power, property and prestige behind the [constitutional
violation]." 8 2

Under these circumstances, the state and the students are sufficiently intertwined to justify a finding that the students are not
private actors but agents of the state.
The same result obtains under the state compulsion prong of
the state action doctrine. Under this prong, state action is found
where the government has coerced or encouraged the action
alleged to violate the Constitution. 8 The same facts that lead to
the conclusion that the students are agents of the state under the
symbiotic relationship prong 4 lead to the conclusion that the
state is not neutral under the compulsion prong. In fact, quite the
opposite is true: the state encourages the prayer.8 5
2.

The Delegation Is Not Saved If The Decision To Have
PrayerIs Put To A Majority Vote

In a number of cases, the decision to have prayer was left to
the students to decide by majority vote. 8 6 At best, this fact is irrelevant, at worst, it makes the conduct even more egregious.
The fact is irrelevant because the state has the ultimate
87
It
responsibility to operate its institutions according to the law.
makes no difference who decides that school prayer should occur
as there is no meaningful distinction between school authorities
82. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974) (quoting Burton,
365 U.S. at 725).
83. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 80, § 16.3 at 543; San Francisco Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
84. See supra text accompanying note 81.
85. In ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471
(3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
went even farther. It held that in every practical sense, the school had compelled
participation in graduation prayer even though the decision to have prayer was
delegated to the students to decide by majority vote. Id. at 1480-83.
86. This probably is done to mirror the policy at issue in Jones, which left the
decision to have graduation prayer to the senior class. See, e.g., id. at 1474-75
(the school board directed that a policy be prepared that would parallel the
holding of Jones).
87. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1994)
("[Whether school officials make the decisions or give their authority to decide to
another, the ultimate responsibility for those decisions is borne by school
officials."), vacated as moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1996

17

320

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 1
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW

[Vol. 18:303

actually organizing the religious activity and merely permitting
students to direct the exercise.a
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that the majority cannot use the machinery
of the State to practice its religious beliefs.5 9
Finally, the notion that fundamental rights can be put to popular vote is repugnant to the very principles of the Constitution.
[A]n essential principal [sic] of our system of government is that
fundamental constitutional rights are not subject to popular vote.
Thus, it is one of the most important roles of the federal courts to
ensure that the constitutional rights of the few or the powerless
are not infringed because their views are unpopular with the
majority. Without these principals [sic], and without the independence of the federal courts to preserve them, ours would not be a
democracy at all but rather a tyranny at the whim of the
majority. 90
88. Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist. , 644 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir.) ("these
cases support no meaningful distinction between school authorities actually
organizing the religious activity and officials merely 'permitting' students to
direct the exercises"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); ACLU, 84 F.3d at 1479
(school's delegation of decision to have graduation prayer to students "does not
insulate the School Board from the reach of the First Amendment"); Gearon v.
Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(Establishment Clause violation occurs "regardless of who makes the decision
that the prayer will be given"); Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F.
Supp. 417, 423 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (rejecting the distinction that prayer and Bible
readings "were performed through the auspices of the Student Council" rather
than the school).
89. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
In ACLU, 84 F.3d 1471, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit rejected the free speech arguments made in favor of a "student-initiated"
prayer policy that delegated the decision to have prayer to the students to decide
by vote. It stated:
[The policy] allowed the 128 seniors who wanted verbal prayer at their
graduation to impose their will upon 140 of their fellow classmates who
did not. The [School] Board's position would have us recognize a right in
that plurality to do so, and ignore the right of others to worship in a
different manner, or in no manner at all. This we can not do because
"the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all."
Id. at 1477 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).
90. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F.
Supp. 1235, 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
As James Madison noted in his discussion of majoritarian tyranny: "When a
majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government... enables it to
sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss3/1
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Over and over the Supreme Court has stated that the protections in the Bill of Rights do not depend on a majority vote. 9 1 And
the lower courts have done the same.9 2 As the Ninth Circuit
explained in a school prayer case:
[S]chool officials cannot divest themselves of constitutional
responsibility by allowing the students to make crucial decisions
...."The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, [319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)] .... Elected officials
cannot avoid constitutional mandates by putting them to a majority vote. "One's ... fundamental rights may not be submitted to

vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." Id. "The notion
that a person's constitutional rights may be subject to a majority
vote is... anathema." Gearon v. Loudon County Sch. Bd., 844 F.
Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993). Giving majorities the power of
the state without constitutional restrictions undermines the9 limi3
tations on majority oppression the Constitution establishes.
B.

Free Speech Arguments Made In Favor Of The New
Technique Are Without Merit

Proponents of the new technique argue that prohibiting "student-initiated" prayer violates the free speech rights of those students who wish to pray.94 It is true that "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
other citizens." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
91. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) ("[Tlhe Bill of Rights
removes entire areas of legislation from the concept of majoritarian
supremacy."); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 73637 (1964) ("A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply
because a majority of the people choose that it be.").
92. See, e.g., Siff v. State Democratic Executive Comm., 500 F.2d 1307, 1308
(5th Cir. 1974) ("[Tihe Supreme Court has made clear on many occasions that
matters guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of religion, are not to
depend on majority vote."); Kelleher v. Southeastern Regional Vocational
Technical High Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) ("A majority of citizens
...cannot deprive the minority of their right[s].").

93. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated as moot, 115 S.Ct. 2604 (1995).
94. See, e.g., Harris, 41 F.3d at 448 (intervenors argue that they have free
speech rights to have graduation prayer); ACLU, 84 F.3d at 1477 (school board
"attempt[s] to define the instant controversy as one impacting upon the students'
right of free speech").
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the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."95 Thus, if private student prayer were at issue in the socalled "student-initiated" prayer situations, free speech arguments would have merit. But, private student prayer is not what
is at issue.
These are not situations where students on their own initiative bow their heads in silent prayer by their lockers, at their
desks, or before or after their meals. These are not situations
where students spontaneously sing devotional hymns while walking down the hall, during lunch, or at recess. While such practices
are permissible, the practices being challenged are very different.
The practices being challenged are those in which the school has
endorsed religion by dedicating a special place and a special time
for prayer.9 6 No other speech is afforded such a privileged status.
Recall the language of the Mississippi statute: "prayer shall be
permitted." Just prayer - no other speech is guaranteed time.
Once the role of the state in the prayer is clarified, it is apparent
why the free speech claims made in support of the new initiatives
must fail.
1.

These Are Not Cases of Equal Access; These Are Cases of
Special Access

One argument made by the proponents of the new initiatives
is that prohibiting prayer violates principles of equal access. This
argument cannot succeed.
Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has developed
a line of cases holding that when a school opens its premises to use
by student groups and the public, it may not exclude religious
groups from school facilities simply because of the religious nature
of their activities. These cases, which have become known as the
equal access cases, began with Widmar v. Vincent.9 v In Widmar,
the Court held that when a state university makes its facilities
95. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (emphasis in

original).
96. This distinction has critical constitutional implications. See id. at 252
(noting that when a school permits a student-initiated and student-led religious
club to meet after school, just as it permits any other student group to do, it does
not convey a message of state endorsement of the particular religion); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) ("an open forum .

.

. does not confer any

imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices").
97. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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generally available for the activities of student groups, it may not
close them to a student group wishing to use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion.9 8 More recently, the Court
decided Board of Education v. Mergens.9 9 In Mergens, the Court
held that any public secondary school that receives federal financial assistance and permits student groups to meet on school
premises during non-instructional time cannot deny access to a
student group that wants to use its premises for religious purposes.' 0 0 In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,1° 1 the Court held that a school that allows its property to
be used by community groups after hours cannot deny access to a
church that wants to use the premises to show a film depicting
10 2
religious viewpoints about family life.
As should be apparent, the equal access cases are inapposite.
Under the "student-initiated" prayer legislation, guidelines, and
policies, religious users are the only users given special access to
the school. No other users are given access at all. Thus, the equal
03
access cases do not advance the argument in favor of prayer.
2.

Schools Are Not Public Fora For Speech

Proponents of the new technique argue that since schools are
public fora, prayer cannot be excluded absent a compelling state
interest. This interest, they argue, cannot be established.
There are three types of fora for speech: the public forum by
tradition, the public forum by designation, and the nonpublic
forum. 10 4 A public forum by tradition is property, such as the
streets and parks, which "ha[s] immemorially been held in trust
for the use of the public and, time out of mind, ha[s] been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens
and discussing public questions." 0 5 A public forum by designation is property that the state appoints specifically as an area for
98. Id. at 278.
99. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
100. Id. at 253.
101. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
102. Id.
103. In fact, the new technique contravenes the mandate of nondiscrimination
set forth in the equal access cases; it discriminates in favor of prayer.
104. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985).
105. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(quotation omitted).
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expressive activity."' 6 A non-public forum is property that is
neither by tradition nor by designation a forum for public
07
communication. 1
To enforce a content-based exclusion in a public forum by tradition or a designated public forum, the state must show that the
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.10 8 In a non-public
forum, the state may freely regulate content as long as its regulations are reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.1 0 9
Here, states have not created designated public fora in the
schools because they have not opened the schools up to all speech.
As stated in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education
Fund, Inc. ,11o the government does not create a public forum by
permitting only limited discourse.'1
The new initiatives only
guarantee religious speech time at school events; other speech
does not enjoy such a privilege.1 1 2 In fact, only one type of religious speech is guaranteed time: prayer. It is doubtful that reli11 3
gious speech questioning the existence of God would be allowed.
Thus, the public forum analysis proceeds under a reasonableness test - restrictions based on content are permissible if they
106. Id. at 46.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 45-46.
109. Id. at 46.
110. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
111. Id. at 802.
112. See ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1475
(3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (student at school where graduation prayer was to occur
pursuant to a "student-initiated" policy was denied permission to discuss safe sex
and condom distribution).
113. The conclusion that a designated public forum is not created when a
school facility is not open to all speech is supported by the case law. ACLU, 84
F.3d at 1478 ("High school graduation ceremonies have not been regarded, either
by law or tradition, as public fora. . . ."); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41

F.3d 447, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1994) (graduation not a public forum), vacated as
moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 679,
684 (6th Cir. 1994) (school hallway not a limited public forum "because the school
maintains the right to control what is posted there and does not offer space to
other religions and causes"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1822 (1995); Berger v.
Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir.) (public school not
open fora), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2344 (1993); Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5
F.3d 1383, 1393 n. 16 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that high school football game was
non-public forum); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F.
Supp. 331, 337 (N.D. Iowa 1989) (graduation not public forum).
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are reasonable. Here, a restriction on prayer is a reasonable
effort
114
to avoid running afoul of the Establishment Clause.
3. Tinker Has No Application To "Student-Initiated"Prayer
Cases
Some proponents of the new technique argue that under
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,"5
and substantially disprayer must be allowed unless it directly
16
rupts the operations of the school."

In Tinker, three students alleged that the school violated
their First Amendment free speech rights by suspending them for
wearing black armbands to protest the government's policy in
Vietnam. Holding for the students, the Supreme Court stated:
"Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging
in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
17
,operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained.""
Tinker, however, does not apply where the speech at issue
interferes with the rights of others. Specifically, the Tinker Court
stated: "[A student] may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so ...without

colliding with the rights of others.""8 In the case at hand, the
prayers collide with others' First Amendment rights protecting
them against the establishment of religion.
Moreover, Tinker is distinguishable because the speech at
issue in that case could not be perceived as bearing the imprima114. See, e.g., Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 776 F.2d
431, 437 (3d Cir. 1985) (promoting appearance of neutrality is "sufficient
justification for excluding speakers from a nonpublic forum").
In fact, because the school has a compelling interest in preventing violations
of the Establishment Clause, it may be argued that the result would be no
different if the school events were determined to be designated public fora. See
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (interest of university in complying
with its constitutional obligations "may be characterized as compelling").
115. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
116. See Reply Brief of Appellant Attorney General And Brief Of CrossAppellee at 19 n.9, Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 65 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1996)(No. 96-331); see also
Smothers, supra note 22, at A12 (prayer is "a student free-speech issue, just as
the wearing of black arm bands by students in school to protest the Vietnam war
in the 60's was a free-speech issue").
117. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quotation omitted).
118. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
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tur of the state.1 19 Here, however, the schools' involvement in the
prayers is so extensive that the prayers cannot avoid bearing the
imprimatur of the state. As discussed above, to call the prayers
"student-initiated" is a misnomer; they are school-initiated and
school-sponsored. 120
C. ProhibitingThe Prayer Will Not Abridge Students' Free
Exercise Rights
Prohibiting the prayer authorized by the new initiatives will
not interfere with the free exercise rights of those wishing to pray.
Students will not be prevented from practicing religion. They may
continue to pray during school hours, as for example, during an
appropriate moment of silence or with others pursuant to the
school's equal access policy. Moreover, they remain free to worship as they please before and after school, on the weekends, and
when school is not in session. As Justice Brennan stated: "The
student's compelled presence in school for five days a week in no
way renders the regular religious facilities of the community less
accessible to him than they are to others." 12 1 And as a majority of
the Supreme Court noted in Abington School District v. Schempp:
[We cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not
permit a State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected, collides with the majority's
right to free exercise of religion. While the Free Exercise Clause
clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free
exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use
the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs. 122
119. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988);
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
120. The facts supporting the conclusion that the students are agents of the
state, see supra text accompanying note 81, further support the conclusion that
the prayers bear the imprimatur of the state. See Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No.
241, 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding impermissible school involvement
where school ultimately controls and underwrites the event where prayer is
offered), vacated as moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1404-05 (10th Cir. 1985) (students will not
distinguish between faculty supervision and school sponsorship); Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1984) (impression of
school approval created by presence of teacher or someone associated with school
particularly where compulsory education system encourages attendance),
vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
121. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
122. Id. at 225-26 (footnote omitted).
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III. Two BYPRODUCTS OF PRAYER: DivIsIvENEss AND
DEGRADATION OF RELIGION

A. Are We a ChristianNation? The Divisive Effects of Prayer
in School
12 3
There are beneficial effects of religious thought in school.
But in this nation there is great diversity of religious belief,124 and
unfortunately, religious minorities, nonconformists, and dissenters are often subject to scorn, alienation, and worse. This can be
no surprise as that which separates us tends to spawn hostility,
and religion has proven to be one of the strongest dividers. For
verification, one need only consider the religious wars currently
raging around the globe.12 5 The "religious war" in our own country, although less bloody - but not bloodless 12 6 - comes with its
own brutality.
Consider the following community and individual responses
to those who objected to various types of religious activities in
school.

123. The Jones court stated:
[Plublic schools[ have the] responsibility to develop pupils' character
and decisionmaking skills, a responsibility more important in a society
suffering from parental failure. If religion be the foundation, or at least
relevant to these functions and to the education of the young, as is
widely believed, it follows that religious thought should not be excluded
as irrelevant to public education.
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
124. There are at least 1,200 organized, distinct religious groups in America,
many of them outside the Judeo-Christian tradition. Self-proclaimed secularists
make up about 10% of the population, with growing numbers of Muslims,
Hindus, and New Age adherents. Joe Loconte, Lead Us Not Into Temptation: A
Christian Case Against School Prayer,71 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV., Winter
1995, at 24, 26-27.
125. Some of these wars have been going on since the beginning of time. As
Mark Twain wrote:
Man is a religious animal. He is the only animal who has the true
religion - several of them. He is the only animal who loves his
neighbor as himself and cuts his throat if his theology isn't straight. He
has made a graveyard of the globe in trying his honest best to smooth
his brother's path to happiness and heaven.
Mark Twain, The Lowest Animal, LETTERS FROM THE EARTH 227 (Bernard Devoto
ed., 1962).
126. See Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion
Clinic, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
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1. A Jewish high school student in a predominately Mormon
Utah community objected to singing a repertoire of choral songs,
every one of which praised Jesus Christ. Other students
responded to her objections by calling her a "dirty Jew." 12 7 The
girl was told to "go back to Israel."' 28 Swastikas and "Jew Bitch"
12 9
were scrawled on her student government campaign posters.
13 0
Her family received nearly 200 threatening telephone calls.
2. Parents of schoolchildren brought a lawsuit challenging,
among other things, a school district's policy of allowing religious
meetings to be held on school premises during school hours and of
permitting the distribution of Bibles at school. 1 3 ' The parents
received threatening telephone calls and letters, their children
were called "devil-worshippers" by other students, and an upsidedown cross was hung on one child's locker. Two of the children
were the only students not recognized at the school sports banquet, and one parent was the victim of a hair pulling incident by a
school employee. Finally, one family's home was destroyed by a
13 2
fire of suspicious origin.
3. A student and her father brought suit challenging a school
district's practice of allowing a basketball coach to sponsor prayer
at the end of each game and at practice. 33 Plaintiffs argued that
allowing the prayer fostered a climate in which the objecting student was singled out and subjected to criticism because of her religious beliefs.13 4 Apparently, upon deciding not to participate in
the team prayer, the coach required the student to stand outside
the prayer circle. 13 5 At away games where the girls were not
allowed to return to the locker room except as a group, the
objecting student regularly had to stand apart while the coaches
and other students prayed. 3 6 The record showed that the student
was asked "Aren't you a Christian?" by other students, that one
spectator stood up after a game and yelled, "Well, why isn't she
127. Andrea Stone, Jewish Teen Stands Against Utah Choir's Christian Tone,
USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1995, at A4.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391, 1396 (10th Cir.

1985).
132. Id. at 1397.
133. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1993).

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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praying? Isn't she a Christian?,"
and that her teacher called her
13 7
"a little atheist" during class.

4. A student brought suit challenging a school practice of offering
invocations prior to football games. He was subsequently lectured
on Christianity. 138
5. A Jewish student challenged the constitutionality of a "Prayer
Amendment" to the West Virginia Constitution. 1 39 He was told by

one student that if he prayed "maybe [he] could go to heaven with
all the Christians ... instead of ... going down with all the other
Jews."1 40 A second student suggested that the others should not

even try to talk with the objecting student "because
the Jews
" 14 1
Christ.
killed
had
they
because
saving
worth
weren't
6. Children who refused to attend Bible study classes in school
42
were called atheists and devil worshippers by their classmates. 1
A teacher put earphones on one of the children to drown out the
sound of prayer being offered over the intercom
thus prompting
43
other children to call the boy "football head."1
7. A student who opposed a "student-initiated" prayer policy
received threatening letters in his school locker and threatening
telephone calls at home. 1
These examples illustrate the divisive effects religion can
have in the public schools and should give pause to those who promote school-sponsored prayer. As one of our most distinguished
jurists stated:
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the
most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than
in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to145say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart.
137. Id. at 162-63.
138. Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826-27 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
139. Walter v. West Va. Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169, 1170 (S.D. W. Va.
1985).
140. Id. at 1172
141. Id.
142. Stephanie Saul, A Lonely Battle in the Bible Belt; A Mother Fights To Halt
PrayersAt Miss. School, NEWSDAY, Mar. 13, 1995, at A8.
143. Id.
144. ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1488 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
145. Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
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B. State Involvement DegradesReligion
Ultimately, government involvement in religion has the effect
of degrading it. 14 6 A union between government and religion

degrades religion by watering it down or homogenizing it as a precondition for government approval. 147 It also creates the potential
that the favored religion may be compromised by political figures
148
who reshape the religion's beliefs for their own purposes.
Finally, degradation results because that which is coerced cannot
be truly meaningful.

14 9

Thus, Justice Blackmun has stated: "[Rieligion flourishes in
greater purity, without than with the aid of Government." 150 It is
this very notion that has led religious conservatives to voice opposition to school prayer.' 5 ' And it is this notion that should serve
as a further note of caution for the proponents of prayer.
CONCLUSION

The technique of "student-initiated" prayer must fail on legal
grounds. The Establishment Clause demands that the state be
neutral with regard to religion. A state is not neutral when it del146. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
606 & n.8 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147. Cf Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.) (against desire of
proponents of prayer must be weighed desire of others not to have prayer "either
because the prayers were too religious or not religious enough"), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 957 (1965).
148. Lee, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
149. As has been said of Christianity:
Although life may abandon us, although faith may be more on our lips
than in our hearts, although that genuine understanding of Holy
Scripture may fail us, yet we force men by intimidation to believe what
they do not believe, to love what they do not love, and to understand
what they do not understand. Compulsion is incompatible with
sincerity, and nothing is pleasing to Christ unless it is voluntary.
Letter from Desiderius Erasmus to Carondelet (1523), in JOHN C. OLIN, SIx
EssAYs ON ERASMUS AND A TRANSLATION OF ERASMUS' LETTER TO CARONDELET,

1523, 105 (1979).
150. Lee, 505 U.S. at 608 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in THE
COMPLETE MADISON

309 (S. Padover ed., 1953)) (brackets omitted).

151. See Joe Loconte, Lead Us Not Into Temptation: A Christian Case Against
School Prayer, 71 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REv., Winter 1995, at 24, 24 (noting
that "a growing number of conservative, evangelical Christians are raising deep
concerns about the difficulties that even student-led prayer creates in matters of
faith, conscience and civility").
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egates to the students a decision that it is prohibited from making
itself. It is not neutral when it enforces that decision by compelling compliance. When it does so, it steps over the line of neutrality and into the realm of the impermissible. The technique fares
no better on policy grounds. Although many believe that schoolsponsored prayer can have only positive effects, the facts are to
the contrary. Such prayer has the potential to degrade the
strength of religious beliefs and as illustrated above, hatred, intolerance, and violence can accompany the practice. Thus, regardless of the constitutionality of school-sponsored prayer, these
ramifications caution strongly against its implementation.
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